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This article is based on an ethnographic study of prenatal screening for Down syndrome in two British 
healthcare institutions. Drawing on observations of everyday hospital life and interviews with 
healthcare professionals, I identify how a discussion of Down syndrome is avoided within prenatal 
screening consultations. This relative silence is created and upheld owing to three observations: 1) the 
British public is interpreted as “knowing” what Down syndrome is; 2) the organization of care dictates 
that the condition is not classified as important enough to justify an explanation within consultations; 
3) professionals frequently admit to holding minimal knowledge of Down syndrome. This absence, 
together with the condition being categorized as a “risk” or “problem,” helps produce and uphold its 
status as a negative pregnancy outcome. I conclude by highlighting the contributions that this article 
has for anthropologically exploring how ideas around disability intersect with the proliferation of 
reproductive technologies. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Introduction 
It is almost 150 years since John Langdon Down first described what is now known as Down syndrome 
(or Trisomy 21). Down syndrome is one of the most common chromosomal conditions in the world 
and symptoms can include learning difficulties, reduced muscle tone, shortened limbs, restricted 
physical growth, a flat profile of the face, and a large protruding tongue (NHS FASP 2012). Although a 
common feature of Down syndrome is the variability and inconsistency of its manifestation, the 
condition is often “compatible with life” or “not lethal” (Ivry 2009), meaning individuals are likely to 
survive childbirth. Indeed, people with the condition are now leading longer, healthier lives and can 
survive beyond sixty years today (CARIS 2012). 
In 2011, approximately 74% (N=542,312) of all expectant mothers in England and Wales (no 
statistics for Scotland were found) opted to be screened for Down syndrome (NHS FASP 2012), 
although statistics vary significantly between countries (Vassy et al. 2014). Additionally, in 2012 in 
England and Wales, of the 1,259 prenatal diagnoses of Down syndrome, 90% were terminated 
(N=983), 7% were live births (N=76), and 3% were natural miscarriages or stillbirths (N=34), though 
the outcome of 166 prenatal diagnoses is unknown (Morris and Springett 2014). From the first report 
in 1989 until 2012, the annual rates for termination in England and Wales have ranged from 88% to 
94%. Since Down syndrome has taken such a central position in British reproductive politics, it is ripe 
for an anthropological analysis to establish the contours, complexities, and contradictions emerging in 
antenatal care. 
In this article, I unpack how Down syndrome is discussed within prenatal screening consultations. 
Many authors capture the problematic relationship between disability and reproductive technologies 
(Ginsburg and Rapp 1995, 2013; Ivry 2006; Landsman 2009; Parens and Asch 2000; Rapp 1999, 2000; 
Rothman 1994; Shakespeare 1999; Vailly 2014). However, many of these accounts are guilty of two 
charges. First, they often rely on scholarly speculation or interview data alone (Asch 1999; Remennick 
2006). Whilst the substance and contribution of such accounts cannot be discounted, attending to the 
mundane interactions of the antenatal clinic reveals important contributions regarding how Down 
syndrome is constructed in medical practice. Second, disability and Down syndrome specifically are 
commonly framed as universal categories. Davis (1995:xv) identifies the totalizing tag of “disability” as 
an unstable category denying the variability of the body; “the category ‘disability’ begins to break 
down when one scrutinizes who make up the disabled.” The same can be said for Down syndrome, a 
complex and variable condition. Rather than utilizing a universal term unfairly and inappropriately 
pigeonholing Down syndrome and creating rigid categories of existence, I recognize it as a critical site 
worthy of independent scholarly attention owing to its complexity and notoriety in antenatal worlds. 
In what follows, I initially provide a brief outline of my study. Turning attention to fieldwork, I 
identify how Down syndrome is rarely, if explicitly, discussed during screening consultations. This 
relative silence is upheld owing to three observations: 1) the wider public is framed as “knowing” what 
Down syndrome is; 2) the organization of care dictates that the condition is not classified as important 
enough to explain in consultations; 3) professionals regularly admit to having minimal knowledge of 
Down syndrome. Absent yet present, Down syndrome is subsequently constructed within 
universalizing discourses of “risk,” “problem,” and “abnormality” which, perhaps inadvertently, fashion 
and sustain a negative outlook, as well as mask the variability and complexity, of the condition. 
Answering Han’s (2013) call for attending to the mundane aspects of pregnancy, I present an analysis 
of the quotidian, of a routine medical procedure as opposed to new reproductive technologies (Rapp 
2000), and suggest how unpacking the taken-for-granted interactions of everyday clinical life, in the 
tradition of Erving Goffman (1959; 1963) and Harold Garfinkel (1967), reveals new insights for medical 
anthropology and the anthropology of reproduction. 
  
Setting and methods 
In Britain, expectant parents are routinely offered screening for Down syndrome. During my 
fieldwork at two healthcare institutions – Freymarsh (NHS hospital) and Springtown (privately-funded 
fertility clinic) – two methods were used for screening: 1) serum screening (Freymarsh); 2) a nuchal 
translucency
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 ultrasound scan combined with serum screening (Springtown). Irrespective of the 
screening method undertaken, expectant parents are provided with a “risk factor,” a numerical variable 
establishing the odds of a fetus having the condition. This is calculated using computer software 
which takes into account a number of maternal factors including age, weight, ethnicity, gestation, 
number of fetuses, pregnancy history, assisted conception, and smoking, together with the size of the 
nuchal translucency if an ultrasound scan is undertaken. Expectant parents are subsequently placed in 
a “lower risk” or “higher risk” category. In the two antenatal clinics observed, the cut-off point for this 
categorization was 1:150 (a 1 in 150 risk of a fetus having Down syndrome). If expectant parents 
receive a risk factor above 1:150 (e.g. 1:250), they are categorized as lower risk and offered no further 
treatment other than an ultrasound scan at twenty weeks to check for potential problems (“anomaly 
scan”). In contrast, if expectant parents receive a risk factor below 1:150 (e.g. 1:100), they are 
categorized as higher risk and offered an amniocentesis or CVS (chorionic villus sampling) which 
confirms or refutes a suspected diagnosis. Although providing a diagnosis, possible complications of 
diagnostic testing include causing anxiety and a 1-2% risk of miscarriage (NHS Choices 2014). 
Expectant parents with a diagnosis of Down syndrome receive counseling before deciding whether to 
continue or terminate a pregnancy. The primary objective of screening is to identify expectant 
mothers in whom a risk factor is deemed high enough to warrant offering invasive diagnostic testing. 
Data presented in this article are drawn from an ethnographic study taking place in two healthcare 
institutions. My research initially intended to unpack why scientific and medical communities, together 
with expectant parents, are so invested in prenatally detecting Down syndrome, a practice constituting 
a taken-for-granted component of British antenatal care. Around one year was spent observing each 
institution, paying attention to the routines, deviations, discourses, practices of division, and accounts 
in each setting. As with most ethnographic endeavors, I was guided by an interest in producing an in-
depth evaluation of a research site and the lives of individuals within it. The ethnography took me into 
the many worlds which screening for Down syndrome permeates: antenatal departments, laboratories, 
homes, administrative offices, and so on. However, the majority of my fieldwork was spent in the 
antenatal departments of Freymarsh and Springtown. In this article, fieldnotes and sixteen interviews 
with professionals are drawn upon to make my claims. 
Fieldnotes were recorded on site and typed up after leaving the field. Interviews were audio-
recorded and ranged from thirty minutes to over two hours in length. Material was analyzed using 
“situational analyses” (Clarke 2003), a renovation of grounded theory in which all the key elements of 
the situation, the interrelations, the social worlds in which these are embedded, and the discursive 
positions taken by people were the focus of my analysis. Material was subsequently grouped together 
to establish dis/connections in observations and the accounts of participants. This was read alongside 
literature, allowing for an inductive approach, until intricacies and relationships were identified. Ethical 
approval was granted by NHS and University research ethics committees. 
  
An elephant in the consultation room?2 
Down syndrome screening is delivered by midwives at Freymarsh and sonographers at Springtown. 
In Freymarsh, midwives invite expectant parents into a room prior to screening (around sixteen weeks 
gestation). They highlight and reiterate the details of screening whilst expectant parents are offered an 
opportunity to ask questions and opt in/out of the procedure. In Springtown, no such consultation 
exists prior to undertaking a nuchal translucency scan. Instead, the procedure is described during the 
scan whilst the sonographer navigates the transducer around the expectant mother’s abdomen 
(approximately twelve to fourteen weeks gestation). If expectant parents receive a “higher-risk” result 
following screening (within ten days of the initial procedure), they are offered immediate counseling 
by a professional in which the result is discussed, a leaflet is distributed (the leaflet contains 
information about diagnostic testing and Down syndrome), and diagnostic testing is offered. If 
expectant parents refuse testing, they receive no further treatment. If expectant parents accept 
testing, they return to hospital for the test usually a few days after counseling. Following the test, 
results are analyzed in a cytogenetics laboratory and full results are returned to expectant parents 
within a period of two weeks. If a diagnosis is established, expectant parents must decide whether to 
continue or terminate a pregnancy. This article exclusively draws on data from consultations in which 
screening is discussed or where a higher-risk result for Down syndrome is explained to expectant 
parents. 
In most Freymarsh and Springtown consultations in which screening is discussed, Down syndrome 
is seldom addressed in explicit detail; at most, the condition is cited without further clarification. The 
following fieldnotes are taken from a nuchal translucency scan between Esther (sonographer) and Mr. 
and Mrs. Jones (expectant parents): 
  
Esther: So here’s your baby. You can see the heart beating away there. Little one’s hiccupping as 
well [Mr. Jones and Mrs. Jones laugh]. 
Mrs. Jones: Maybe it’s that sausage and chips I just had! [All laugh]. 
Esther: So we measure the nuchal translucency which is the pad of fluid at the back of baby’s neck. 
When it’s enlarged, it increases the risk of baby having a chromosomal abnormality. We do the 
measurement in combination with your blood-work so you will have some bloods done today. So 
the nuchal translucency and your age and your biochemical bloods and the length of the baby will 
give you a definite risk of three chromosomal abnormalities. We only screen for three, one of which 
is Down [syndrome] which I’m sure you know but also we look at Patau [syndrome] and Edward’s 
[syndrome]
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. I don’t know if you’ve seen about these on the internet but they’re three of the most 
common, two of the most lethal. So during this screening, you’ll be placed in either the lower risk 
or higher risk bracket and if you’re higher risk, you’re advised to have an amniocentesis. Oh God 
you’ve got a wriggly one in here!  
Mrs. Jones: It looks like it’s doing the splits [laughing]. 
Esther: Yes, baby’s doing a dance! We like the nuchal translucency to measure less than 3mm and 
your measurements are all under 3mm which is all great really. 
  
Humor is littered throughout the encounter; Mr. Jones and Mrs. Jones are amused by the 
hiccupping which is ascribed to pre-scan behaviors (eating) and Mrs. Jones frames the fetus’ 
movement as replicating the splits, whilst Esther describes this movement as a dance routine. This 
collaborative work between Esther and the Jones’, essential to making the imagery on the ultrasound 
monitor personally and socially meaningful, reflects the intricate shifts between threat and thrill, that 
is, the (clinical) information communicated around screening practices and the (non-clinical) 
performances of sonographers, expectant parents, and fetuses. The threat involves divulging details of 
nuchal translucencies, chromosomal difference, and diagnostic testing. The thrill, in contrast, 
reconstructs the ultrasound scan as an entertaining experience for expectant parents. 
But what happens to Down syndrome here? Throughout the consultation, whilst the condition is 
cited, no further details on Down syndrome are tendered by Esther nor solicited by the Jones’. 
Assumptions appear to govern proceedings; Down syndrome is shaped as something which the Jones’ 
should “know.” Interestingly, Esther describes the three syndromes screened for – Down syndrome, 
Edward’s syndrome, and Patau syndrome – as “chromosomal abnormalities” and as “three of the most 
common, two of the most lethal.” Esther refrains from clarifying which syndromes are lethal but rather 
relies on Mr. and Mrs. Jones calling upon tacit assumptions regarding which conditions are lethal and 
which condition is not. Similar to Garfinkel’s (1967) et cetera principal whereby people expect others 
to understand situations based on personal knowledge, Down syndrome is framed as a taken-for-
granted category requiring no further elucidation regarding symptoms, prognosis, and the “social 
realities” (Rapp 1988:150) of the child who might have the condition. 
Here, Down syndrome shares similarities to Latour’s (1999:304) “black box,” a metaphor referring 
to the way in which “scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success.” In an analysis 
of how scientific knowledge is made durable, Latour (1991) suggests that such work is only defined by 
its function; the complexity of a given system’s internal workings is redundant providing it continues 
to serve its primary purpose and allows people to proceed in their daily activities. Its output, thus, 
retains the status of truth. 
Whilst Latour’s description refers to how scientific facts are established, I suggest how the medical 
category of Down syndrome (as a “fact”) is established within screening practices. It becomes a 
curious black box, a “known” entity remaining unopened and shrouded. It is an elephant in the 
consultation room, with the midwife/sonographer not providing, and expectant parents not seeking or 
questioning, information around the condition. Much like Latour, I now turn my focus to unpacking 
how the black box of Down syndrome is solidified and made opaque, who is involved in this, what 
affects this has, and why this is significant when reflecting on the politics of reproductive care. 
  
Accounting for absence 
So why is Down syndrome absent during consultations? I identify three distinct yet intertwining 
reasons which shape this silence: 1) the familiarity of Down syndrome; 2) the organization of care; 3) 
the limited knowledge of professionals. I expand on each of these below. 
  
The familiarity of Down syndrome  
As alluded to in the extract between Esther and Mr. and Mrs. Jones, Down syndrome constitutes a 
taken-for-granted category which is recognizable to expectant parents. Several professionals suggest 
that the general public, at large, “know about” Down syndrome. However, they claim that this 
knowledge is limited to the obvious anatomical features, or “face” (Latimer 2013), of the condition. 
During an interview, Amy (midwife) explains: 
  
I don’t think expectant parents understand Down syndrome much unless they have a family 
member or a friend who has a Down syndrome person in the family. But I think they know what a 
Down syndrome person looks like. They don’t always know a Down syndrome person can live until 
they’re sixty-five and seventy and they can live a relatively normal life in the sense that they get up 
in the morning, eat and dress, and that. 
  
Similarly, Rita (midwife) suggests that expectant parents often convey their knowledge of Down 
syndrome by stating that people with the condition “look that way,” translating to the distinctive facial 
features caused by the presence of an extra chromosome. Susan and Maggie (midwives), among 
others, credit such awareness of the Down syndrome “face” to the familiar presence of people with the 
condition in British society. In an interview, Camilla acknowledges this familiarity when identifying the 
difficulties of communicating information to non-British expectant parents: 
  
You get often women from other countries that don’t speak English as a first language and maybe 
don’t really understand what a baby with Down syndrome is because of language barriers and 
cultural differences. Whether they really understand what we’re asking of them or what we’re trying 
to explain in consultations, I’m not convinced. Some people do say ‘I don’t know what a Down 
syndrome baby is.’ And you think, gosh, really [laughs]? 
  
Rapp (1988, 2000) highlights how some non-US patients had no recognition of Down syndrome 
and how English-speaking communities generally held some knowledge of the condition. She 
suggests that local metaphors of pregnancy, birth, and parenthood do not easily translate “into the 
realm of medical discourse” (2000:81). During consultations, my own observations reveal that as well 
as obvious language barriers inhibiting interaction (this was more likely to occur in Freymarsh which 
served a larger non-British population), Down syndrome was, in turn, rarely explicated in any detail. 
Lois (midwife) suggests “it helps to know about Down syndrome as this would affect whether 
[expectant parents] have the screening or not,” with healthcare professionals often accusing expectant 
parents of not holding extensive knowledge of the condition excepting facial features. So why are no 
further details tendered? 
In the clinic, the (aesthetic) familiarity of Down syndrome hinders a broad discussion of the 
symptoms, prognosis, and “social realities” of the condition. In addition, this avoidance emerges on 
account of expectant parents and professionals not wanting to consider it as a possibility. During an 
interview, Lisa (sonographer) suggests this is because despite its compatibility with life, Down 
syndrome is largely understood in negative terms: 
  
I think [expectant parents] probably see [Down syndrome] as very negative by and large. I don’t 
think they know how much support they would get or if they’re told what life would be like if 
they’re given the diagnosis of a Down syndrome baby. How much they’re told will influence them 
whether they’d keep the pregnancy or not. 
  
Whilst Lisa’s contentions (Down syndrome is seen as “very negative by and large”) relate to 
terminating or continuing a pregnancy following a diagnosis, her claims are appropriate for 
considering how Down syndrome is configured in the early stages of antenatal care. The following 
fieldnotes were taken in the Springtown office where expectant parents can book ultrasound scans: 
  
[Dominique, Juliana, and Hannah (administrative professionals) discuss the nuchal translucency 
scan]. 
Gareth: Do you think expectant parents having the nuchal translucency scan know much about 
Down syndrome? 
Dominique: Not really. I think they know about the facial features. 
Hannah: I don’t think they want to know. 
Dominique: It’s not fully entered their heads. 
Juliana: And they know about them being retarded. 
Dominique: I don’t think they know because it’s such a broad spectrum of how they are affected 
too. 
Hannah: Unless they know of someone in the family. 
Juliana: We get more questions about Patau syndrome and Edward’s syndrome. With these 
syndromes, they ask things like ‘what are they?’ Because they aren’t as well known so we tell them 
about that and that’s it really. We bracket it in with Down syndrome. 
  
Hannah describes how expectant parents do not hold extensive knowledge of Down syndrome 
since “I don’t think they want to know.” Thompson (2013) shows how silence can act as a barrier 
against stigma or shame; interactional processes work around and mask difficult or taboo subjects. 
Similarly, during screening consultations, the imagined damage caused by the potential presence of a 
fetus with Down syndrome, as a future deviant body, initiates reluctance from expectant parents and 
midwives/sonographers to openly thrash out the nuts and bolts of the condition. This silence may also 
be interpreted as professionals attempting to reduce expectant parents’ anxiety. In the case of 
screening, there is a tension between providing information and avoiding unnecessary anxiety for 
expectant parents. Thus, the topic of Down syndrome may be discouraged due to a sense of “jinx,” 
that is, by naming the threat, it somehow becomes more likely to happen. In addition, professionals 
may not discuss Down syndrome in any great detail since they have little to offer other than a 
description of the variability and unpredictability of expression (professionals’ knowledge is discussed 
later). This may be true not only for Down syndrome but for other conditions as well, highlighting the 
nature of discomfort in the face of ambivalence. 
 Nonetheless, Down syndrome seemingly amounts to what Taussig (1999:7) describes as a “public 
secret,” namely the ideas of shared knowledge lodged in the imaginary of a particular society which 
are rarely described or openly acknowledged. Symbolically invisible and at its core banal, public 
secrets become a powerful social glue and social knowledge of “knowing what not to know” (1999:6). 
Notably, Taussig focuses primarily on the defacement of public secrets. During the consultations I 
observed, Down syndrome was not revealed as a public secret but rather remained a public secret, 
that is, a hidden and undisturbed category rarely unmasked. Here, the condition becomes significant 
by its absence, at the crossroads between the unmentioned and unmentionable. In sum, the condition 
is downgraded through its silence; it is in its familiarity (as a negative outcome) that Down syndrome 
becomes invisible. 
  
The organization of care 
A second reason why Down syndrome remains absent is that the organization of care hinders 
interactions between expectant parents and professionals. This is particularly evident in Freymarsh 
where a checklist is used to govern clinical practice. The checklist includes eleven “key points to 
discuss,” in Camilla’s (midwife) words, during a consultation: 
  
[After a consultation, Camilla fills in the checklist. The first side of the form asks for details such as 
scan date, ethnic origin, and weight. The second side contains a list of 11 points marked 
“Information Given” which must be clarified during consultations: 
1. Gestation at the time of test 
2. Have you had any other screening test for Down syndrome? 
3. A low chance result ≥ 1:151 
4. Low chance does not mean no chance 
5. Low chance result will be sent by letter within 10 working days 
6. The low chance letter will not state the risk ratio 
7. A high chance result ≤ 1:150 
8. High chance screening result will be provided within 5 working days 
9. An appointment will be offered within 24 hours of contact to discuss a high chance result 
10. Have you considered the amniocentesis test that will be offered following a high chance result? 
11. If you accept an amniocentesis diagnostic test an appointment will be offered as soon as 
possible following a recall]. 
  
Camilla claims that “in order to cover our backs,” midwives follow such rationalized stipulations to 
accomplish appropriate care. Martha (Freymarsh midwife) draws attention to the checklist’s value: 
  
It makes sure we’re all practicing to the same standard so that one midwife doesn’t go in and just 
skip through it. It standardizes practice. With other things you can’t be all the same but with 
screening for Down syndrome, what we say should be standardized before the screening is done. 
  
Lois (midwife) similarly explains that many aspects of antenatal care are reduced to “tick boxing, 
initialing, and that’s it,” similarly citing this as a positive development in the “streamlining” of tasks so 
there is “not too much paperwork.” Midwives dutifully follow the checklist with the intention of 
providing “informed” choice without their own intervention. The neutral stance toward screening and 
testing assumed by professionals has been clearly stated as a principle for decades, meaning 
professionals in Britain allocate decision-making to supposedly rational and responsible expectant 
parents. The rationalization of their practice represents an effort to avoid any bias/morality; it 
consequently reduces care to providing “factually correct medical information” (Bosk 1992:19) 
specified on a checklist establishing the topics worthy of further exposition. The checklist used during 
Down syndrome screening consultations, thus, provides a welcome addition to the clinic since it 
specifies the important data requiring explication. This reflects the routinization and rationalization of 
care/screening practices. Press and Browner (1997) argue that the relatively banal way in which 
prenatal screening is presented leads to it becoming a routine procedure among other treatment 
practices. This relates to Down syndrome screening, in Freymarsh particularly, being offered alongside 
screening for other conditions or diseases such as rubella, HIV, syphilis, rhesus disease, sickle cell, 
thalassemia, and hepatitis B/C. 
Returning to the checklist, a conversation about Down syndrome does not constitute one of the 
“key points to discuss” in a consultation. With care increasingly structured on rational grounds in the 
pursuit of efficiency, the rationalized stipulations introduced by organizational cultures determine 
what information is necessary for sharing with expectant parents. Although the checklist is exclusive to 
Freymarsh, the absence of Down syndrome during consultations in Springtown can also be attributed 
to an extensive deliberation of the condition being seen as non-essential. Operating within strict time 
constraints, midwives and sonographers condense information and only provide details deemed 
significant for expectant parents. Their conduct is shaped by wider organizational cultures which lead 
to Down syndrome being avoided and rendered absent, thus contributing to making the condition 
one of Taussig’s (1999) “public secrets”. 
  
The limited knowledge of professionals 
A third reason for the absence of Down syndrome corresponds to midwives and sonographers 
commonly admitting to lacking extensive knowledge of the condition. Whilst professionals do have 
some knowledge of the condition and likely symptoms, translating detailed knowledge to expectant 
parents is not always possible. When asked about her knowledge of Down syndrome, Sophie 
(sonographer) answers: 
  
I must admit we haven’t particularly been taught a lot about it. I know a lot about testing for it but 
I don’t know a huge amount about the actual condition. I think it goes back if you know somebody 
with it and we’re taught things like the statistics, like 25% of them can have cardiac problems. But 
you’re not particularly taught about that when you do training and stuff.  
  
Sophie credits her limited knowledge of Down syndrome with a lack of training and suggests her 
familiarity with it extends exclusively to screening practices and statistics (“25% of them can have 
cardiac problems”). According to several sources, however, the number of people with Down 
syndrome who have cardiac issues is closer to 50% (NHS FASP 2013). This reflects research suggesting 
that some professionals hold limited – if not outmoded – knowledge of the condition and have little 
direct contact during medical training with people who have developmental impairments (Skotko 
2005). During a conversation, Rita (midwife) draws attention to the difficulties of describing a 
condition without great knowledge of it: 
  
Even if you get a result that means expectant parents will be referred elsewhere, you’re the initial 
person to see them. Sometimes I find that a bit difficult because they start asking you questions 
and I cannot always answer them because I’m not specialized in that area. So I feel a bit bad then 
saying I’m not really the best person to speak to but I will get someone to speak to you. 
  
Notably, Down syndrome is explained in more detail once a diagnosis is suspected and a higher 
risk result must be described to expectant parents in another consultation (to repeat, this follows the 
initial screening consultation and involves asking expectant parents if they want diagnostic testing). 
However, similar to initial screening consultations, the majority of such encounters are conducted by 
midwives (Springtown sonographers bequeath this responsibility to a midwife) who frequently claim 
they have a limited knowledge of Down syndrome. During a consultation in which Mr. and Mrs. Knight 
(expectant parents) are told they have a higher risk of Down syndrome, for instance, Eve and Amy 
(midwives) describe what happens after diagnostic testing: 
  
Eve: If the baby is diagnosed with Down syndrome, you can wait till your full karyotype is in to see 
whether it’s mild or severe. 
Mr. Knight: What is severe then? 
Eve: I couldn’t tell you that. Not now anyway.  
Mrs. Knight: I think what my husband is asking is what would mild be? 
Eve: Well a number of people with Down syndrome can go on to live till sixty years old, and [Eve 
seems unsure and pauses]. 
Amy: Yes, they can sometimes have learning difficulties. But if mild, they can appear quite normal. 
Eve: Yes. They can have a similar IQ level to other children. They can live good lives, some can live 
independently. [Eve pauses again] It depends really. 
Mr. Knight: I do have another different question: where does Down syndrome start? 
Mrs. Knight: Where it’s from? 
Eve: It’s an extra chromosome. That chromosome will be placed somewhere in the genes. We’re 
not sure why it happens. 
Mr. Knight: I read it was when the cells were divided in the chromosomes. 
Amy: It’s a chromosomal thing, yes. It’s not genetic. 
Mrs. Knight: [Turning to Mr. Knight] There’s nothing we can do about it, it’s not one of us. 
Eve: Yes it’s not a genetic thing. 
Amy: Yes. 
Eve: It’s a chromosomal thing. 
  
During such encounters, professionals discuss several issues with expectant parents including the 
meaning of risk factors, the benefits/risks of diagnostic testing, and possible outcomes if a diagnosis is 
established (continuing/terminating a pregnancy). This information is repeated in leaflets distributed 
to expectant parents at the end of the procedure. If they decide to pursue diagnostic testing, more 
leaflets are provided during this consultation about amniocentesis/CVS before undertaking the 
procedure. A higher risk result commonly causes expectant parents to ask further questions about 
diagnostic testing and risk factors in a consultation. Throughout this encounter, Mr. and Mrs. Knight 
ask questions regarding Down syndrome, one of which surrounds its causes. Yet, in most 
consultations of this nature, a discussion of the condition rarely extends beyond midwives or other 
professionals offering expectant parents a leaflet. 
In Springtown, however, the written information provided to parents following a higher-risk result 
does not refer to Down syndrome; it is limited to information on amniocentesis, its risks, blood group 
types, what parents should do before and after the test, and when a result will be received. In contrast, 
the Freymarsh leaflet does offer further details on Down syndrome, specifically how it is a “lifelong 
condition which will result in some degree of learning disability”. It also highlights how the cause of 
Down syndrome is unclear (“it is not known what makes this happen”), the common symptoms and 
prognosis of the condition (“slanted eyes”; “looser muscles and joints than other babies”; “children 
usually develop and learn more slowly than other children”; “they may have some medical problems 
that need special attention and treatments”), and existing support services for parents. This 
description is balanced with more positive discourse relating to early prognosis (“most children will 
learn to walk and talk […] go to mainstream schools and learn to read and write”) and later life (“most 
children and adults can lead healthy lives”; “adults can live partly-independent lives, choosing their 
friends and partners and working or contributing to society in other ways”). This contradicts the claims 
of Bryant et al. (2001) who argue that leaflets for Down syndrome screening often contain false, 
misleading, and inconsistent information on the condition. Even so, a familiar criticism among 
professionals in Freymarsh and Springtown is that expectant parents rarely read the literature. If true, 
the absence of Down syndrome in antenatal encounters becomes even more significant. 
In the uncharacteristic case above with Eve, Amy and the Knight’s, whereby the expectant parents 
solicit details from professionals in a manner which opens the black box/unmasks the elephant in the 
room, Eve and Amy - particularly Eve - seem unsure about the condition and provide vague and 
incorrect information (despite, one may observe, this information being readily accessible in antenatal 
leaflets at the clinic). Here, there is a lack of knowledge of Down syndrome as “not genetic” (although 
Mr. and Mrs. Knight correctly interpret this term as signifying hereditariness
4
) and of people with the 
condition as “sometimes” having learning difficulties (people with the condition will always have 
cognitive impairment, although its severity and meaning is open to variation and interpretation). In 
addition, Eve’s claim that “you can wait till your full karyotype is in to see whether [the diagnosis is] 
mild or severe” is erroneous, namely since the severity of Down syndrome cannot be predicted on the 
basis of karyotyping.  
Even on rare occasions where information on Down syndrome is shared or solicited during 
consultations, the finer details of symptoms, prognosis, and future prospects (physiological and social) 
are vague, incorrect, or excluded entirely. My intentions are not to humiliate or chastise professionals 
for their flawed knowledge regarding Down syndrome. Rather, I argue that one reason for this is that 
in Springtown and Freymarsh, screening is relegated down the medical hierarchy. Doctors and 
consultants in clinical medicine are specifically trained to manage cases such as Down syndrome and 
other genetic conditions, yet do not participate in screening practices. Instead, the task is collected by 
midwives and sonographers, that is, professionals with – as frequently and openly professed – limited 
knowledge of the condition. This identifies possible future training needs for professionals. 
However, one may also consider this interpretation as a useful excuse. Professionals do not 
necessarily view a lack of knowledge about Down syndrome, despite its wide availability, as a deficit in 
performing clinical duties. Indeed, professionals are often not aware of current available services for, 
or the life-span or later-life health issues of, people with the condition, all of which narrow the context 
in which a response to a positive diagnosis will be made. Although training/internships are likely to 
remediate this knowledge deficiency, they are not pursued. As such, the absence of Down syndrome 
becomes a natural and enduring condition. Nonetheless, since neither party shares nor appeals for 
further information on the condition during most consultations, a negative depiction of Down 
syndrome – highlighted by professionals often suggesting that public attitudes toward the condition 
are largely negative – remains intact. The importance of some knowledge about Down syndrome for 
informed reproductive decision-making is emphasised by professionals in this study (criticising 
expectant parents for not knowing what Down syndrome is) and by scholars (Bryant et al. 2001). 
However, the article identifies how Down syndrome is made absent in medical practice. 
 
Risks, problems, and abnormalities 
To recap, I offer three reasons why a discussion of Down syndrome is often avoided through 
absent or at least ambiguous engagements: the familiarity of the condition; the organization of care, 
and; the limited knowledge of professionals. So with the condition spoken around as opposed to 
spoken about, what existing (implicit) discourses shape Down syndrome within interactional 
exchanges? How is the condition discussed when, in turn, it is not discussed? The most common 
vernacular constructing Down syndrome, a vernacular infiltrating antenatal care and childbirth as a 
whole (Possamai-Inesedy 2006), is “risk”; expectant parents are provided with a “risk” factor, diagnostic 
testing carries a “risk” of miscarriage, older women are at an increased “risk” of having a child with 
Down syndrome, and so on. Discussions of risk in relation to prenatal screening/testing for Down 
syndrome are well-rehearsed in the literature (Thomas 2014; Heyman 2010; Markens et al. 1999). With 
regard to this study, the risk discourse is exemplified in the following consultation between Lois 
(midwife) and Mrs. Roberts (expectant mother): 
  
Lois: This is just a chat about the Down syndrome test. Do you know much about Down syndrome 
screening? 
Mrs. Roberts: Not really. I know if it’s abnormal, they’ll offer me another test. 
Lois: Kind of. Do you know what Down syndrome is? 
Mrs. Roberts: Yes. 
Lois: OK. This is a screening test which won’t affect the baby. You’ll be placed in a higher risk or 
lower risk category. The test is 80% accurate so low risk does not mean no risk of having a baby 
with Down syndrome. If you’re higher risk, we’ll offer you an amniocentesis. The cut off is 1 in 150 
so you could be 1 in 148, 1 in 149, 1 in 150, and all that is higher risk. So we offer the 
amniocentesis which takes fluid from around the baby and this says for definite whether your baby 
has an abnormality. But it does have a risk of miscarriage of 1% so if 1 in 100 women have the 
amniocentesis, one will miscarry. But what I badly need to know is whether you want to know 
whether you’re a lower risk or higher risk. 
Mrs. Roberts: Yes, just so I can know. 
Lois: So you would consider having the amniocentesis? 
Mrs. Roberts: I’m not sure. I’d have to speak to my partner. 
Lois: But you’d like to know whether you’re lower risk or higher risk? 
Mrs. Roberts: Yes. I can do something about it afterwards then if something is wrong. 
  
The consultation is described by Lois as “just a chat.” This can be interpreted as an effort to 
manage Mrs. Roberts’ anxiety. The absence of Down syndrome described earlier in the article, indeed, 
may also be viewed as professionals downplaying information until an actual diagnosis as a way of 
managing expectant parents’ anxiety. However, an effect of describing the consultation in this way is 
that it implicitly and immediately downplays the significance of the event. Importantly, after Mrs. 
Roberts confirms that she knows what Down syndrome is, no further details on the condition are 
offered. It retains its status as “abnormal,” an unchallenged label offered by Mrs. Roberts and one Lois 
later assumes. Lois recounts what she perceives as apt information for accomplishing appropriate care 
such as the accuracy of screening, risk factor cut-off rates, prospective diagnostic testing, and the risk 
of miscarriage. Notably, although diagnostic testing risks (e.g. miscarriage) are not explicitly outlined 
on the checklist discussed above, this is regularly mentioned in screening consultations with respect to 
point ten: “Have you considered the amniocentesis test that will be offered following a high chance 
result?” 
During the consultation, Lois uses the word “risk” on several occasions. The implicit assumptions 
shaping wider readings of risk paint a negative picture. A potential risk status not only shifts health(y) 
identities of expectant mothers, but also demarcates Down syndrome itself as a “risk,” in effect, a 
threatening possibility. The widely-circulated term risk carries negative connotations; if something is a 
risk, it is to be feared and avoided (Lupton and Tulloch 2002). With risk indicative of a threat and 
having “connotations of danger and negative outcomes” (Shakespeare 1999:673), its common use 
within screening encounters portrays Down syndrome as a preventable pregnancy outcome. In 
addition, during the consultation between Lois and Mrs. Roberts, the offer of an amniocentesis “within 
24 hours” not only highlights the gravity of the situation but also marks potentially detecting the 
condition as offsetting the possibility of miscarriage caused by diagnostic testing.  
Interestingly, the use of the term risk was challenged by midwives and sonographers in both 
Freymarsh and Springtown and by governing bodies administering stipulations for best clinical 
practice. Members of each party suggest the term “chance” should be embraced over “risk” in 
consultations; expectant parents, for instance, should be told they receive a chance result, as opposed 
to a risk result, of having a child with Down syndrome (the checklist previously outlined in this article 
uses the term “chance”). Amy (midwife), among others, claims “risk sounds too negative.” However, 
observations reveal that whilst risk/chance was sometimes used synonymously by professionals, “risk” 
is used much more than “chance” in consultations. This oversight, highlighting the discrepancy 
between what one “says” and what one “does,” did not appear to emerge as a conscious decision. 
Rather, it is a product of the routinization and integration of a risk discourse in everyday practice, 
together with the observation that highly pressurized and medicalized service providers have yet to 
convert their language or thinking to reflect transformations in contemporary public culture and 
“official” legislative efforts which emphasize inclusion. 
Within screening practices, the configuring of Down syndrome as a risk is reinforced with similar 
pervading classifications. At Freymarsh and Springtown, Down syndrome – since it is not cited 
explicitly – becomes synonymous with “problem,” “bad news,” “a bad scenario,” “something wrong,” 
and, most commonly, an “abnormality.” The fieldnotes taken during a nuchal translucency scan 
between Olivia (sonographer) and Mrs. Burton (expectant mother) highlight this: 
  
Olivia: Now the nuchal translucency involves measuring the fluid at the back of the baby’s neck. 
This white line and this white line is where it is. We want that gap to be less than 3mm and I can 
say it looks tiny from first view.  
Mrs. Burton: So that’s a good one? 
Olivia: Yes. 
Mrs. Burton: So it’s a bad scenario if the bit at the back of the neck is not there then? 
Olivia: No. The more it is, the higher the chance of abnormality. So a small measurement is good. 
The measurement is 1.6mm too which is brilliant. 
  
Olivia repairs the impending danger of a “bad scenario” by highlighting the “brilliant” 
measurement which points toward the likely absence not of Down syndrome but of the much vaguer 
category of “abnormality.” Despite the frequency of this repair work in consultations, a commitment to 
discursive categories of risks, problems, abnormalities, and bad scenarios – shaping Down syndrome 
as a universal “thing” – takes on greater significance once considering Francine’s (midwife) suspicion 
that expectant parents “only really pick up keywords.” Since professional conduct provokes 
interpretive acts among expectant parents, the discursive categories surrounding Down syndrome 
uphold it as a detrimental pregnancy outcome. Furthermore, it blurs the complexity of Down 
syndrome and the potential differences between two or more people with the condition. 
It is true that Down syndrome is not a benign condition. Symptoms can be debilitating and, in 
some cases, fatal. However, the important point here is that the variability and complexity of the 
condition, namely as promising an uncertain prognosis yet often being “not lethal” (Ivry 2009), is 
masked by describing it in universal and negative terms which discount this complexity. This is also 
reflected in expectant parents being offered screening, at once, for several conditions and diseases 
including (but not limited to) rubella, HIV, syphilis, rhesus disease, sickle cell, thalassemia, hepatitis 
B/C, and Down syndrome. The positioning of Down syndrome, a condition categorized by many 
professionals as “compatible with life” and people with the condition as “good” human beings, with 
diseases/disorders such as HIV and hepatitis B/C demarcate and uphold it as one component of the 
(universal) abnormal category. 
 
Discussion 
In this article, I identify how an extensive discussion of Down syndrome is absent during screening 
consultations. I attribute this to three developments: 1) the familiarity of the condition to the British 
public; 2) the organization of care which renders a wider discussion of the condition as unnecessary 
and trivial; 3) the lack of knowledge among some professionals about Down syndrome. The condition 
is subsequently framed in the negative and universal categories of “risk,” “problem,” and 
“abnormality.” In sum, I recognize how professionals can communicate, not communicate, or 
miscommunicate medical information as well as structural power arrangements, social knowledge, and 
ideas around certain bodies/future bodies (Rapp 2000). 
The article offers three significant contributions to an anthropological understanding of 
reproduction. First, it highlights the pertinence of attending to absence and what/who is left off the 
table. Whilst a focus on interactional exchanges reveals what “is” said in the clinic, it also exposes what 
“is not” said, with the example of Down syndrome screening serving as a reminder of how absence has 
a social dimension which deserves and necessitates further reflection. What is left unsaid can be as 
important as, or more important than, what is said. Second, the article – in the tradition of Goffman 
(1959; 1963) and Garfinkel (1967) – highlights the value of analyzing the mundane, taken-for-granted 
components of everyday life and the ordinary routines deeply embedded in the fabric of medical 
culture. The language of science and genetics claims to be neutral/universal yet it produces and 
reproduces rich, layered, and powerful messages (Rapp 2000; Rothman 1994). In this study, I do not 
rely on prescribed medical definitions of Down syndrome. Instead, I identify that by attending to banal 
discourses and practices, we can reveal how the condition is negatively constituted in mundane 
interactions and everyday medical work and talk. 
Third, the article supports the call to deconstruct universalizing categories which trivialize and 
unfairly catalogue the social world into neat categories, thus discounting its intricacy and 
contradictions. Arguably, the medical work described here is not merely a trivialization or dismissal of 
the complexity of Down syndrome but, rather, a crucial example of exclusionary practices, at the 
mundane and implicit level, which stigmatizes certain ways of being in the world (i.e. having a 
disability). Down syndrome is a complex and heterogeneous condition, with symptoms varying 
significantly in each case, yet such inconsistences in expression are rarely reflected in medical practice. 
The diversity in manifestation, together with better healthcare and education access for people with 
Down syndrome, seemingly contradicts medical descriptions of Down syndrome and the emphasis on 
prenatally detecting the condition, the latter observation being described by others as implicitly 
defining what kind of lives are worth living (Asch 1999; Press and Browner 1997). Although Down 
syndrome may be explained further by professionals once a diagnosis is established or largely 
suspected, the discourse around Down syndrome (as a risk, problem, and/or abnormality) in the early 
stages of antenatal care arguably shapes expectant parents’ opinions and means that the damage 
may already have been done. 
Healthcare professionals were the original driving force behind the introduction of innovations in 
prenatal diagnosis and, subsequently, screening (Vassy et al. 2014). In contemporary antenatal care, 
professionals are still located at the heart of screening practices, playing a key role in expectant 
parents’ decision-making processes. Much of the debate around Down syndrome screening 
recurrently revolves around the discourse of choice, freedom, and neutrality/non-directive care, that is, 
an ideological framework described elsewhere as fiction (Asch 1999; Bosk 1992; Rapp 2000). This 
discourse legitimizes public policy (Vassy et al. 2014) yet frequently glosses over the need for a critical 
engagement with how Down syndrome and other conditions are configured (or not) in antenatal care. 
More broadly, it masks how the category of “abnormality” is both reproduced and expanded in such 
medicalized practices (Vailly 2008). Under the guise of giving pregnant women choice, developments 
in biomedicine allow for the control over the type/quality of fetuses (Vassy et al. 2014) and reproduce 
ideas around the “normal”. In short, the categories of normality and abnormality are culturally 
constructed, associated with the production of a social, moral, and political order (Vailly 2008).  
In relation to this study, I capture how Down syndrome – the condition itself and its complexity and 
variability – is both made absent (in line with public policy) and how it is implicitly condemned into 
the universal category of abnormal, that is, the opposite of normal, in antenatal care. I put forward 
that this portrayal emerges owing to these clinical practices, the routinization of “opt-in” screening in 
the context of no treatment (Down syndrome cannot be “cured/fixed” yet is the focus of prenatal 
detection), and the medicalization and technologization of biomedicine with its emphasis on 
developing “techniques capable of uncovering and managing deviants” (Vailly 2008:2541). 
This article shows how Down syndrome and screening for the condition is entangled in political, 
social, and cultural debates in the realm of reproduction. Screening is a technology which both 
enables and constrains, expanding opportunities whilst provoking dilemmas about the acceptability of 
intervention (Franklin 1997; Strathern 1992). Since screening practices so often spill beyond the 
biological and into public arenas and intimate lives alike, it is increasingly ripe for an anthropological 
analysis. With regards to this article, I suggest that by drawing attention to the mundane and everyday 
interactions of the antenatal clinic, we may uncover assumptions buried deep in medical culture. In 
addition, it identifies possible training needs for professionals such as improving current educational 
resources about conditions like Down syndrome, together with highlighting how requests to use the 
term “chance” instead of “risk” in consultations need to be fulfilled. In sum, this study – by offering 
“thick” descriptions of relatively “thin” encounters – reveals how Down syndrome is constructed in 
antenatal care and the implications this has when reflecting on the condition, and disability more 
generally, at the intersection of medical technologies. Since increasingly sophisticated prenatal 
technologies show no sign of abating, obstetric medicine will continue to transform and shape 
reproductive politics in Britain, as well as other countries offering screening, for the foreseeable future. 
It is within this context that the configuration, or absence/presence, of Down syndrome in clinical 
practice becomes of paramount importance for anthropologists of reproduction and for the people 
that prenatal technology directly implicates, namely, both expectant parents and healthcare 
professionals. 
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Notes 
1. A nuchal translucency is a collection of fluid in the nape of a fetus’ neck. Screening for Down 
syndrome at Springtown involves measuring this fluid. 
2. An “elephant in the room” is a British idiom for an obvious truth, risk, or problem which is 
overtly avoided or unaddressed. 
3. Patau syndrome (Trisomy 13) and Edward’s syndrome (Trisomy 18) are relatively rare 
chromosomal conditions categorized as incompatible with life. 
4. There are three forms of Down syndrome: Trisomy 21 Down syndrome (94% of cases); mosaic 
Down syndrome (2% of cases), and; translocation Down syndrome (4% of cases). Only translocation 
Down syndrome can be hereditary. 
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